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Abstract
This work presents a north-south endogenous-growth model that reproduces some recent
EU stylized facts: convergence between countries, divergence within the same countries, more
spatial concentration of economic activity and higher growth rates.
We claim that the ongoing technological reduction of transaction costs can conceivably spur
those phenomena, specially if a regional productive duality within the less-developed countries
were reinforced by a biased incidence of that fall in transaction costs.
A key element is Grossman and Helpmans complementarity between innovation and imi-
tation. The channels that allow for higher growth-rates are migrations and scale-e¤ects in the
industrialized regions of the poorest countries.
1 Introduction.
Can we expect European countries and regions to converge in the long run? Is there any role for
regional policies to reshape the relative position of local steady states?
Boldrin and Canova (2001)s recent empirical research suggests a negative answer to both ques-
tions. They found no signicant correlation between labor-productivity growth and the structural-
fund contribution to capital endowments in recipient regions. Though cautiously, they used these
All this work would have been impossible without the guidance and encouragement of Howard Petith, my former
advisor. On the other hand, some useful comments from Jordi Caballe, Antonio Ciccone, Angel de la Fuente and Dilip
Mookherjee are gratefully acknowledged. I am also grateful to La Caixa Fellowship Programme. The usual disclaim
is in order.
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results as a key to select between competing economic theories concerning EU stylized facts. Which
were these alternative theories?
First, neoclassical (exogenous-growth) models imply that the local steady-state relative positions
depend on microeconomic features, una¤ected by current levels of cumulative factors. Therefore,
policies aimed at an even distribution of cumulative stocks are irrelevant in the long run.1 On the
other hand, divergence-models2 allow for agglomeration externalities, which make initial cumulative
stocks really crucial with respect to the relative position of steady states. As a consequence, policy
is extremely relevant, and in the dynamic (endogenous-growth) models a trade-o¤ arises between
regional cohesion and global growth rates. Consequently, Boldrin and Canovas ndings seemed to
support neoclassical models, typically associated with less activist regional policies, at the expense
of the case for divergence models.
In our work we try to emphasize two ideas related to that controversy: rst, available empirical
evidence does not exclude any theoretical paradigm; second, and more importantly, maybe the whole
dilemma between both paradigms is not the right discussion.
Why not? As J. S. Pischke noted in a comment to Boldrin and Canova (2001), decreasing  
return structures and local agglomeration nodes may be alternating; not only in time for a
given place; but also in space for a given period of time. In that case, it may be interesting to
consider some duality in the regional production functions within countries, unlike the usual practice
followed in both neoclassical and divergence models.
Certainly, both paradigms exhibit symmetry in local production functions but for the initial
stocks of capital and public knowledge. However, recent growth-accounting exercises3 detect fast
 convergence rates towards rather diverse steady states, emphasizing sectoral specialization and
TFP di¤erences as crucial elements that keep local steady-states apart. We have exploited that image
of dually-structured countries to construct a model that respects Boldrin and Canovas ndings.
Moreover, our model reproduces some recent EU stylized facts: international convergence trends
accompanied by regional divergence within the same countries.4
Our modelling tool is a north-south framework with an exogenous fragmentation within the
southern (and poorest) country. This one consists of an industrialized core, which could potentially
1See, for example, Sala i Martin (96).
2See (for example) Krugman (91), Krugman and Venables (95), Krugman and Livas Elizondo (96), Puga (99),
Martin and Ottaviano (99) or Baldwin and Forslid (2000).
3See Islam (95), Canova and Marcet (95), De la Fuente and Domenech (2001) or De la Fuente (2002b).
4Martin (98, 99) and Esteban (94) have documented these phenomena for the EU as a whole: in most member
countries the distance between better-o¤ and worse-o¤ regions grows larger and, at the same time, both groups of
a­ uent and lagged regions become more and more internally homogeneous.
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host local agglomeration economies, and a periphery doomed to host just primary sectors under
perfect competition. We assume that international-trade barriers for our homogeneous good do not
decay at the same pace of those for manufactures, as if biased technological changes a¤ected di¤er-
ently the transaction costs of both sectors5 . Under some conditions, since the northern aggregate
income is larger, a marginal increase in trade openness for manufactures induces a net inow of de-
mand for southern manufactures: this raises the relative wage of the core with respect to the north.
Simultaneously, the relative wage of the core with respect to the periphery also increases, since
primary goods remain barely as attractive to foreign consumers as before. Then, these widening
income di¤erentials within the south give rise to migrations, which also enhances peripheral wages
and favors north-south convergence (reproducing our stylized facts).
Concerning a growth evaluation, such an agglomeration of labor force in the core turns out to
be benecial for the growth rate of the global economy. In our framework (based in Grossman and
Helpman (91)) imitation and innovation are complementary activities. Therefore, given that some
of the new immigrants in the core will undertake research activities, they will enlarge the southern
catch-up potential and the growth rate of the global economy. The last e¤ect holds because a
stronger imitation will reduce northern wages and increase the value of a patent, raising the natural
incentives to innovate. Taking all this into account, any policy measure that restricts periphery-core
migrations proves to be harmful in terms of steady-state growth. But not necessarily in terms of
regional cohesion, since a higher catch-up potential may boost core-periphery divergence patterns.
Our theoretical results conform with Boldrin and Canovas empirics, but they are at odds with
neoclassical views about the irrelevance of regional policies in the long run. On the other hand,
our dual structure within the south di¤erentiates our conclusions from those of many divergence
models: rst, there is a trade-o¤ between long-run growth and core-periphery (instead of north-
south) cohesion; and secondly, unlike Puga (99) or Krugman and Livas Elizondo (96), regional
inequalities do not fade away as trade openness becomes almost perfect. This nal di¤erence arises
because trade-openness shocks are sectorally biased, acting as centripetal forces that drive economic
activity towards the core.
In this model there is an interaction between an R&D sector, where patents are either copied
or conceived, and a manufacturing sector whose varieties compete horizontally under monopolistic
competition. The expected stream of prots for those manufacturing varieties is equal in equilibrium
to the corresponding value of the patent. Moreover, our locations -north, core and periphery- are
institutionally distinct. This distinction justies, by assumption, two noticeable facts: rms can
not move from north to core (and viceversa); and patents can not be traded from north to core or
5For an empirical study that conrms this tendency, linked to the recent breakthrough of telecommunications, see
Rauch (99).
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viceversa either, because there are specic features in every location that can not be successfully
replicated abroad.
We do next a comparison between 2 di¤erent steady states, each of which is characterized by a
di¤erent level of trade openness for manufactures. In section 2 we derive the properties of a generic
steady-state. Section 3 contains the comparative-statics exercise that reproduces our stylized facts.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The model without migration
As in Grossman and Helpman (91), we consider 2 countries - north and south - and the competi-
tive interaction of rms from both of them. One important novelty is the existence of a periphery
within the south. Researchers from the core can only replicate northern patents to sell the corre-
sponding products at lower cost, whereas the institutional atmosphere in the periphery impedes the
production of manufactures. The competitive environment for industrial varieties shows horizontal
di¤erentiation, monopolistic competition and no temporal obsolescence.
In the global economy there is a continuum of industrial varieties with measure n, and n =
nc + nn (the addition of the measures from the north and the core). This degree of product variety
expands over time due to innovation. Moreover, an increase in the local measure of manufactures
enlarges the stock of public knowledge and reduces future R&D-costs. Grossman and Helpmans
local stocks of knowledge are equal to n in the north - since all patents were originally made up
there - and to nc in the core.
Then, by free entry in the innovative activity, the value of a patent is at most equal to the labor-
cost of its imitation (in the core) or of its creation (in the north). Given the linear specication of
the externality, that value decreases with the local stock of public knowledge in this way:
vc  amwc
nc
; with equality when _nc > 0 (1)
vn  awn
n
; with equality when _n > 0 (2)
where amnc and
a
n stand for the number of researchers needed to imitate a northern patent in the
core and to create a new variety in the north, respectively. Our variables wa; wc and wn denote
the nominal wage in the periphery, the core and the north, respectively. Later we will establish
some necessary and su¢ cient parameter restrictions so that imitation and innovation coexist, which
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implies that
wn =
nvn
a
;wc =
ncvc
am
(3)
Aggregate populations in the north and the south (Ln and Ls; respectively) are xed by assumption,
but there can be migrations within the same country. That means, in short, that Southerners can
move from periphery to core (and viceversa) in response to economic-opportunity variables; i.e.
Ls = La + Lc, where La (the peripheral population) is an endogenous variable.
Any representative household (or individual) k, living in that location k, maximizes (in every
period t) an intertemporal utility function W kt such as
W kt =
Z 1
t
e (s t) log

Us
 
Xis; As

ds (4)
Wkt reects the discounted utility ow that household k expects to obtain from period t onwards
by acquiring manufactures (grouped into the composite X) and the homogeneous agricultural good
(A). On the other hand, the particular form of Us reveals the relative weight assigned to food and
manufactures in the following way:
Us = X

s A
1 
s , where 0 <  < 1 (5)
The composite of manufactures Xs is a Dixit and Stiglitz subutility function over the aggregate
measure of varieties invented up to period s;
Xs =
"Z n(s)
0
xj (s)

dj
# 1

(6)
where 0<  < 1 is a positive measure of the substitutability between manufactures and xj (s)
quanties the household demand for variety j at time s; 8s  t:
The production function for every particular manufacture and the primary good is identical
and very simple: 1 unit of labor generates 1 unit of nal output. Prior to the production of
any manufacture it is necessary to incur a xed cost (to buy, invent or imitate the corresponding
patent), which is nanced by means of gross savings. On the contrary, labor is the only factor in
the production of food.
The function Wks is intertemporally maximized with respect to its ultimate arguments (xj(s);8j;
8s  t; A(s) 8s  t) at every period t, taking as given the expected temporal paths vn (s) ; vc (s) ;
n(s); pj (s) 8j and pa (s) ; 8s  t: As Grossman and Helpman do, this problem can be decomposed
into 2 parts:
- The static allocation of a given per-household expenditure Eks among the primary good and all
kind of manufactures, which gives rise to demand function for each of these commodities.
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- The choice of an optimal path for Eks ; given the possibility of saving and investing in equity of
southern and northern rms.
2.1 Static optimization.
Let us denote by E the aggregate world expenditure and by  the proportion of E spent by North-
erners, which is an endogenous variable. The parameter   1 introduces the classical iceberg-notion
of international trade costs: it is necessary to buy  units of that good abroad to consume 1 unit at
home. Considering that demand for any variety comes from both northern and southern consumers
who face di¤erent c.i.f. prices, we can derive the aggregate demand for any northern (xn) and
southern manufacture (xc), taking into account (5), (6) and our previous denition of  as follows:
xn = p
1 2
n

E
nnp
1 2
n +  nc p
1 2
c
+
(1  )  E
 nnp
1 2
n + nc p
1 2
c

(7)
xc = p
1 2
c

  E
nnp
1 2
n +  nc p
1 2
c
+
(1  ) E
 nnp
1 2
n + nc p
1 2
c

(8)
where 2= 11  . In expressions (7) and (8), as in Martin and Ottaviano (99),  = 1 2 (0    1)
is a measure of trade openness in the global economy with respect to manufactures:
Concerning rms, they maximize prots at any period s taking into account a demand of the type
(7) or (8) and the simple production function described above. As a result, both utility and prot
maximization from expressions (6), (7) and (8) result in a common optimal price for all industrial
rms in location k, which is a constant mark-up over marginal costs:
pk =
wk

; for k= north, core. (9)
Then, from (9), per-period operating prots for any manufacturing rm in location k are
k =

1  


wkxk for k=north, core (10)
On the other hand, we assume that the wage di¤erential between north and core is high enough
for southern imitators to quote the unconstrained optimal mark-up. Therefore, this wide-gap as-
sumption will only be satised if the original manufacturer can not undercut the southern rm
without incurring losses, i.e. i¤
wc

  wn (11)
Given that the primary sector is characterized by perfect competition and free entry, the agricul-
tural price is equal to the peripheral wage and per-rm operating prots are zero. We assume that
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international transaction costs for primary products remain unaltered. So, without loss of generality,
we state that these costs are just nil. Taking all this into account,
pa = wa =
(1  )E
La
(12)
2.2 Dynamic optimization: system of di¤erential equations.
Now we have to face the intertemporal allocation of expenditure and savings, not only to distribute
consumption across the time horizon, but also to nance new start-ups in the north and the core.
In the appendix we solve the general continuous-time optimization program for a representative
household living in location k (k= north, core, periphery).
Moreover, we must follow the evolution of the aggregate measure of manufactures in the core and
the global economy ( _ncnc ;
_n
n ) by looking at the labor-market-clearing conditions. These equilibrium
conditions in the core and the north can be specied considering the available production function
and the technology in the imitation and innovation processes:
Lc = am
_nc
nc
+ ncxc (13)
Ln = a
_n
n
+ nnxn (14)
An important point in Grossman and Helpman (91) is the choice of a numeraire to evaluate
wages and prices at any moment in time. We follow their normalization and take current aggregate
expenditure as the numeraire:
E(t) = 1 8t (15)
This implies that all wages and prices are always measured in units of current aggregate expenditure.
Our denition of steady state is made explicit in three di¤erential equations (see the appendix).
If we combine these 3 di¤erential equations with expressions (3) and (15), we can redene our
steady state as a situation in which the values of wn; wc and c= nnc remain stable, i.e. our system of
di¤erential equations becomes
_wn
wn
=
_n
n
+
_vn
vn
 
°E
E
=
Ln
a
  (n  nc)xn
a

1 +
(1  )

c
(c  1)

+
1
(c  1)

Lc
am
  ncxc
am

+  (16)
_wc
wc
=
_nc
nc
+
vc
vc
 
°E
E
=
Lc
am
  ncxc
am
+  (17)
°c
c
=
_n
n
  _nc
nc
=
Ln
a
  nnxn
a
  Lc
am
+
ncxc
am
(18)
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2.3 Steady state without migration.
If we could prove that there are some values c*, wn* and wc* for which °c= °wc = °wn = 0, this would
imply that there exists a steady state for our system of di¤erential equations established in (16),
(17) and (18). From (17) ; in our candidate to steady state
ncxc
am
= 

Lc
am
+ 

(19)
and from (13), (18) and (19)
g =
°n
n
=
°nc
nc
= (1  ) Lc
am
   > 0 (20)
We can observe that our innovation growth rate is exclusively determined by the monopoly power,
the discount rate and the imitation capacity of the core.
Therefore, from (13) and (20),
°vc
vc
=
°vn
v
=  g (21)
Now, from equations (15), (21) and also the arbitrage condition (50) in the appendix, we are ready
to obtain reduced-form equations for the prots of any northern and southern industrial rm:
n = (+m+ g) vn; c = (+ g) vc (22)
Let us denote by c the steady-state proportion of southern industrial rms. It is useful, as Grossman
and Helpman do, to express c as a function of m and g, where m=
_nc
nn
is our imitation rate. Since
m = g c(1 c) , we can solve now for c :
c =
m
m+ g
(23)
As a consequence, from (3), (10), (14), (22) and (23), we can restate the arbitrage condition corre-
sponding to northern manufactures as follows:
n
vn
=

1  


Ln
a
  g

m+ g
g

= +m+ g (24)
By combining (20) and (24), we can already derive a formal expression for the steady-state imitation
rate m:
m =
8>>><>>>:
0, if Lna  Lcam
(1 )[ Lcam 
Ln
a ]((1 ) Lcam )
 (1 )[ Lcam 
Ln
a ]
; if Lcam  Lna  Lcam  

1 
1; if Lna  Lcam  

1 
9>>>=>>>; (25)
As could be expected, m rises with the imitation potential of the core relative to the northern
innovation capacity:

Lc
am
  Lna

: We can already establish a rst set of parameter restrictions so
that the global economy exhibits a positive innovation rate and a positive measure of manufactures
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operate in both countries. That is, we want that 0< c < 1, which requires 0< m < 1 and
0< g <1: As we prove in the appendix, this initial condition can be simply summarized as follows:
0 <

Lc
am
  Ln
a

<

1   (26)
2.4 Steady-state absolute and relative wages.
There are still several endogenous variables to be determined that are crucial for our comparative-
statics exercise. Two of them are the relative wage of the core with respect to the north (! = wcwn )
and : From equations (7), (8), (9), (13), (14) and (15), we can get an idea of the determinants of
! as follows:
xn
xc
=
Ln   ag
Lc   amg
m
g
= !2C(; Lc; !) (27)
where C(; Lc; !) =
24 (g=m)!2 1+ + (1 )(g=m)!2 1+1

(g=m)!2 1+ +
(1 )
(g=m)!2 1+1
35 (28)
We can see from the left-hand side of (27) that only the supply-side fundamentals - i.e. industrial
workforces in both countries and innovation and imitation long-term capacities - can modify xnxc :
That means that any variation in international trade openness () will be exactly o¤set in the long
run by a countervailing adjustment of !:
Our term C(; Lc; !) is a direct measure of the home-market advantage of one of the countries to
o¤er higher wages for similar supply-side fundamentals. The country with a higher demand capacity
(i.e. the north if  > 1=2) will be able to reward better the labor force, since less demand will be
wasted paying transaction costs there. Before we explore the relative-wage consequences of a rise in
, we need to express  in terms of the parameters for a steady-state situation. Next lemma will be
of considerable help.
2.4.1 Lemma 1 :
In any steady state without net migratory ows, any households expenditure is identical to that
households income period by period. Therefore, the steady-state aggregate northern and southern
incomes are equal to  and 1-, respectively, and there are no net savings.
Proof. See appendix.
Subsequently, let us derive some formal expressions of northern and southern aggregate income.
From (12), (15), (72) and our denition of  it is possible to come out with a neat expression of this
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variable as a fraction between zero and one:
 =
1
1 +
( 1 wn )+ !Lc +[(1 nnLn)a(
g
m+g )+(1 cnLn)am!]
Ln[1+(nna( gm+g )+cnam!)]
(29)
In the denominator of (29), wn is an endogenous variable that has not been fully specied yet in
terms of the parameters: So, we need to obtain an expression for local absolute wages as well. Lets
dene rst
Q =
m
g
!1 2 (30)
Now, if we plug (7) into (14), divide numerator and denominator of the latter expression by
 
wn

1 2
and rearrange, eventually we nd that
wn =

(Ln   ag)


1 + Q
+
(1  ) 
 +Q

(31)
Proceeding in a similar way, we can solve for wc from (13) as follows:
wc =

(Lc + am)


1 + Q
+
(1  )
 +Q

Q (32)
Now we can really derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition for an increase in ! in response
to a marginal rise in trade openness () : In order to provide a benchmark that discloses the main
determinants of convergence, we start adopting an extreme assumption: the imitation capacity of
the core and its share in the aggregate measure of manufactures is innitesimal. That means that
Lc ! amLna
+
:
We also adopt the following simplifying assumptions concerning the distribution of nancial
wealth:
nnLn ! 1 ; cnLn ! 0+; cc = ca = 1=Ls (33)
where kl is equal to the proportion of aggregate wealth from location k owned by any household
living in location l. That is, although people own some shares of foreign equity, the aggregate
magnitude of those shares is negligible. We can argue that very small international capital movements
su¢ ce to preserve the arbitrage condition (22).
2.4.2 Proposition 1:
lim
Lc!am Lna
+
 
d!
d

> 0 i¤ 2 > 1 
Proof. Lets rewrite the second part of expression (27) as follows:
C (; Lc; !) =

 
m!1 2 + g

+ (1  )   m!1 2 + g
 (m!1 2 + g) + (1  ) (m!1 2 + g) (34)
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After a marginal increase in ; the right-hand side of (27) has to remain constant, because nothing
is altered in the left-hand side of the equality. Therefore,
lim
Lc!am Lna
+
(dC=d)
C
=   lim
Lc!am Lna
+
2 d!d
!
(35)
Then, if we take logs of (34) and compute the total derivative, we can get that
(dC=d)
C
=
 
2   (1  )


1    1  2 
 
d!
d
h
Q (2  1)  2     + (1  ) 2  1    1  2+ dd!   1  2i


1    1  2 (36)
From (35) and (36),
d!
d
=
!
 
2   (1  )
2   1    1  2+ (2  1)Q 2     + (1  ) 2  1    1  2+ dd! !  1  2
(37)
In order to determine the sign of lim
Lc!am Lna
+
d!
d
! ; it is useful to know the limit-value of ! when
Lc ! amLna
+
: From (27),
lim
Lc!am Lna
+
Ln   ag
Lc   amg
m
g
=
"
lim
Lc!am Lna
+
!2
#"
lim
Lc!am Lna
+
C(; Lc; !)
#
(38)
Our parameter restriction (26) guarantees that g > 0 and then, from (25), (34) and (38), 0 =h
lim
Lc!am Lna
+ !2
i h

1 (1 2)
i
: As we can infer from (29), 0< 
1 (1 2) <1 provided that  > 0:
Then, as a consequence,
lim
Lc!am Lna
+
! = 0+ (39)
Moreover, since we can easily check that lim
Lc!am Lna
+

d
d!

is nite, from (27) ; (30) and (39) it is
possible to conclude that lim
Lc!am Lna
+

d
d!

! = lim
Lc!am Lna
+(Q) = 0; and therefore, by (37),
lim
Lc!am Lna
+
d!
d
!
=
2   (1  )
2   1    1  2 (40)
Since the denominator of (40) is positive,
lim
Lc!am Lna
+

d!
d

> 0 i¤ 2 > (1  ) (41)
Next, from (29) and (31) we can obtain that
lim
Lc!am Lna
+
(1  )
wn
=
(1  )

(Ln + a) (42)
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Now, if we plug (42) into (29), we can restate condition (41) only in terms of the parameters:
lim
Lc!am Lna
+

d!
d

> 0 iff nn >
1

 
1 + 2
 " 1    1 + 2
a
+
1
Ln
#
(43)
Finally, taking into account our assumptions in (33),
lim
Lc!am Lna
+

d!
d

> 0 iff 2 >
1  

There are 2 opposite e¤ects of a reduction of international transaction costs on the relative
wage !: The rst one has to do with the di¤erence in aggregate income between north and south: a
wealthier north will be likely to raise its demand for every southern manufacture beyond the increase
in aggregate southern demand for any northern good. This would result in a rise of ! if there were
no other active forces. Lets call this the relative-size e¤ect.
But there is still another e¤ect. Since most di¤erentiated products are initially produced in the
north, the southern price-index will decrease sharply with a rise in ; whereas the northern one will
remain almost unaltered. This phenomenon tends to reduce ! in steady state to keep xnxc according
to the supply-side fundamentals.
The strength of this price-index e¤ect decreases with the initial degree of trade openness (),
since higher values of  imply more symmetry in the relative impact of new trade liberalizations on
the local price indices. Therefore, for d!d to be positive we do not only need a large di¤erential in the
size of both countries, but a high enough initial value of : Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, a
very high relative-size e¤ect has been guaranteed, which makes trade openness the only determinant
of the evolution of relative wages.
But we would like to know what happens to relative incomes out of this extreme situation, i.e. for
any initial distribution of Southern population between core and periphery. Our next objective will
be obtaining the function !c = wcwa = f (La; ) that determines the labor-market-clearing relative
wage in the south as a function of La and : The intersection of this curve with an exogenous
migration function !c = h(La), which yields the amount of people willing to live in the periphery
as a function of the relative wage, will o¤er the nal-steady-state values (L*a(),!c*()):
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3 Steady state with migration
3.1 The role played by migratory movements.
Since we want to reproduce some stylized facts, it is convenient for us to rule out any price-index
e¤ect threatening to abort north-south convergence. Then, the relative-size e¤ect will remain as the
single driving force. Therefore,  > 1=2 appears as a natural fact for a north-south structure that
(together with   ! 1 ) could be enough to achieve international convergence in per-capita income.
But lets provide rst a su¢ cient condition for  > 1=2 in terms of the parameters.
Lemma 2 :
Given our assumptions in (33), lim !1  () > 1=2 if Ln > L^n (Lc) ; where L^n (Lc) is a monotone
increasing function.
Proof. See appendix.
The assumption made explicit in (11) involves that lim !1  (!) < , from which we can also
derive the following lemma.
Lemma 3:
There exists a unique upper-bound Lc  Lc such that the wide-gap assumption holds together
with the coexistence of a positive measure of northern and southern manufactures; i.e. 9 a unique
Lc such that (11) and (26) are simultaneously satised i¤
am
Ln
a
< Lc  Lc < am

Ln
a
+

1  

8a; am
Proof. See appendix.
Our notion of steady state is partially characterized by the following equality:
!c = f (La; ) = h(La) (44)
where !c = h(La) is our migration function, for which we adopt a convectional convex, downward-
sloping shape (as in Faini (96)).
In this model we just take as given the main features of the migration function, but we will
endogenously determine the curve !c = f (La; ) : From (12), (20) and (32) we can obtain that
lim
!1 
!c = lim
!1 
f (La; ) = lim
!1 
24 La
(1  )


Q(La;)
1+Q(La;)

(Ls   La + am)
35 (45)
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where
lim
!1 
Q(La; ) =
24 (1  )
h
Ls La
am
  Lna
i
  (1  )
h
Ls La
am
  Lna
i
351  "  (Ls   La + am)
Ln   a(1 )am (Ls   La) + a
#
(46)
Here we can appreciate the two basic e¤ects of a declining peripheral labor force (# La) on !c :
- First, the numerator and denominator of (45) directly capture the straightforward labor-supply
e¤ect : if new immigrants come from periphery to core, !c will tend to decrease for a given value of
Q.
- Secondly, the quotient Q(La;)1+Q(La;) is decreasing in La because it reects the gain in imitation
potential of the core after an inow of former peripheral workers. This force tends to increase the
fraction of the total measure of manufactures produced in the core, which channels world demand
to this location and can potentially raise wc:
The relative strength of these two e¤ects varies along the relevant range of values of La :
Ls   amLna ; Ls   Lc

. In fact, Q(La; ) acts as a positive measure of the imitation potential in
the core. Moreover, additional migration reinforces much more that potential the lower Q(La; ) is.
In other words, once you have copied a high proportion of northern varieties, it is harder for you to
raise your local wage by further imitating: you have to compete - every time more toughly - with
more and more producers in your own location.
In fact, since by (45) f (0; ) = f
 
Ls   amLna ; 

= 0 8 and our function f is continuous in
La;we know for sure that f (La; ) shows an inverted-U shape 8. That is, we can observe both an
upward-sloping part of the curve - where the labor-supply e¤ect is stronger - and a downward-sloping
one, with a dominant imitation-potential e¤ect6(see gure 1).
3.2 Main results.
Now we will obtain a su¢ cient condition for the ratio Rca =
per-capita income in the core
per-capita income in periphery to increase
in response to a marginal rise in :
Proposition 2:
Let Rca =
Yc=(Ls La)
Ya=La
be the core-periphery relative per-capita income. If in the original steady
state the following conditions are satised: a) Ln > L^n(Ls); b) amLna < Lc < L

c ; c)  ! 1 ; d)
6Provided that the whole range of values of La satises the wide-gap assumption, i.e. if Ls   amLna < Lc :
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dh
dLa
< lim!1 

@f
@La

; then :
dRca
d
> 0;
d!c
d
> 0;
dg
d
> 0;
dLa
d
< 0
Proof. See appendix.
With a sudden rise in , the dominance of the relative-size e¤ect - when we are close to full
openness - weakens the home-market advantage of the north. The subsequent rise in !c attracts a
net migratory ow from periphery to core and increases our southern imitation potential. Hence, the
increase in c caused by migrations channels more world demand towards southern manufactures
and exerts an upward pressure on the labor costs in the core. This force countervails the labor-
supply e¤ect, which usually happens when industrial competition within the core is soft enough and
southern labor force is su¢ ciently sticky.
Given the signicant agglomeration e¤ects on labor productivity detected in the EU by Ciccone
(99), accepting that @f@La < 0 does nor seem counterfactual. Neither does the extreme stickiness of
labor in many European countries (see Bentolila (99)). In that case, restraining migrations would
be likely to mitigate core-periphery divergence, though at the expense of foregone growth-e¤ects in
the global economy.
Lets try to face now the north-south convergence issue in a similar fashion.
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Proposition 3:
If in our initial steady state amLna  Lc  Lc , Ln > L^n (Ls) ;  ! 1  and dhdLa <
@f
@La
; then
necessarily dRnsd < 0, where Rns is the relative per-capita income of the north with respect to the
south.
Proof. See appendix.
There are three forces involved in the comparative-statics evolution of relative north-south per-
capita income, two of which exactly o¤set each other. These 2 opposite forces, whose joint e¤ect is
nil, can be described as follows:
- First, the net inow of workers to the core enhances the innovation rate and, consequently, also
the demand for labor in the north, which tends to raise wn :
- At the same time, although the global economy innovates faster, a higher imitation potential
raises the proportion of southern manufactures. Hence, a lower proportion of total nancial wealth
owned by the Northerners exactly makes up for the higher demand for researchers in that country.
Therefore, the only e¤ect capable of modifying  comes from the aggregate demand for manufactures
produced in the north. This aggregate demand goes down in terms of our numeraire, since the
northern home-market advantage weakens.
Corollary:
If in our initial steady state amLna  Lc  Lc < am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
; Ln > L^n (Ls) ;  ! 1  and
dh
dLa
< lim!1 

@f
@La

; then, in our comparative-statics exercise
dRca
d
> 0;
dg
d
> 0;
dLa
d
< 0;
d
d
< 0 and
d!c
d
> 0:
Proof. Straightforward from the last 2 propositions.
4 Conclusions.
We have studied a north-south endogenous growth model where exogenous institutional features
play a major role: they determine the relative incidence of a biased shock in trade openness on 2
distinct southern regions. Within our southern country, we have considered a perfectly-competitive
market structure for the periphery together with some sources of agglomeration economies in the
core. As a result, we have reproduced our stylized facts, i.e. the coexistence of per-capita income
convergence between countries and divergence within the same countries.
16
The existence of scale e¤ects generates a trade-o¤ between core-periphery convergence and global
steady-state growth. But not necessarily a trade-o¤ between long-run growth rates and north-south
convergence.
We conclude that, no matter how generous interregional transfers are, if they do not help trans-
form peripheral productive structures they can not prevent an asymmetric exposure to trade shocks.
If transfers also restrained migratory ows, they could reduce the core-periphery gap, though only
by lowering all Southernerslabor income.
On the other hand, if transfers helped to industrialize the periphery the scale-e¤ects would be
larger. This looks an argument to advocate structural changes in the periphery as opposed to
direct transfers to household consumption. But, in order to elaborate on this, we need to do some
welfare analysis requiring transitional dynamics and an explicit formulation of both migratory and
structural-change costs.
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6 Appendix.
6.1 Households Intertemporal Optimization.
In order to allocate expenditure and savings over time, any household k must choose in every period
s a variation in its portfolio composition, buying or selling equity from northern and southern rms.
During that process we have to keep in mind that, in every period s, a fraction m = _ncnn of the
northern measure of varieties is copied by southern imitators.
Let n and c denote the current operating prots of any northern and southern industrial rm,
respectively. At every period t, household k owns a measure nk (s) of northern rms and ck (s) of
southern rms. Moreover, fnk stands for the proportion of gross-savings devoted to buying northern
equity. We will explore the properties of an interior equilibrium in which new start-ups from both
countries are nanced (i.e. 0< fnk < 1).
Our control variables are Ek (households expenditure) and fnk (s) ; whereas the state variables
are nk (s) and ck (s) : Then, the present-value Hamiltonian faced by any household in location k
at time t for the period s is the following:
Hk(s) = e
 (s t) logEk(s) + nk(s)

(wk + nkn + ckc   Ek) fnk(s)
vn
 mnk

+
+ck(s)

(wk + nkn + ckc   Ek)(1  fnk(s))
vc

(47)
The rst-order condition for an interior solution for fnk (s) is the following:
nk (s)
vn (s)
=
ck (s)
vc (s)
; 8s (48)
The rst-order condition with respect to Ek (s) yields, due to equation (48) ; that
e (s t)
1
Ek (s)
=
nk (s)
vn (s)
=
ck (s)
vc (s)
; 8s (49)
And therefore, by di¤erentiating and using the rst-order conditions with respect to the state vari-
ables,
°E
E
=
°Ec
Ec
=
°En
En
=
°Ea
Ea
=
n
vn
 m  + _vn
vn
=
c
vc
  + _vc
vc
(50)
Now, by grouping terms, we can dene A= Envn and B=
E
ncvc
. From (13), (14) and (50), it is
possible to obtain a system of 3 di¤erential equations in A, B and c= nnc .Our steady state without
migrations will be dened by equating these di¤erential equations to zero.
On the other hand, the system describes the dynamics of A, B and c, but the separate evolutions
of E, vc and vn can not be disentangled. As a consequence, Grossman and Helpman have one degree
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of freedom to normalize E=1, which implies (by equation (3)) that
A =
1
awn
; B =
1
amwc
(51)
From the last expression and the denitions of A, B and c above, we could specify before the
wage dynamics in (16) and (17). Consequently, by (16), (20), (51) and our denition of steady state,
1 +
1  

c
(c  1)
 
Ln
a
 

(1  ) Lc
am
  

 

(1  ) Lc
am
  

1
(c  1) = +
Ln
a
(52)
Finally, solving for c in (52) we can get that
c =

(1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i (53)
The trivial fact that nnc; i.e. c1, imposes our restriction (26) on the value of the parameters.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. From our denition of Rca; assumption (33) and lemma 1 we can derive that in any steady
state
Rca =
!c [(Ls   La) + am (1  caLa)]
(1 + caam!c) (Ls   La) (54)
From (44), any marginal variation in  must yield the following migratory reaction between steady
states:
lim
!1 
dLa
d
= lim
!1 
24 @f@
@h
@La
  @f@La

35 (55)
The assumptions of the proposition guarantee that the denominator in (55) is negative. As to the
numerator, from (30) and (46) we can obtain that
lim
!1 
@f
@
=
La
(1  )

(Ls   La)
"
(2   1)Q+ @Q@
(1 +Q)
2
#
(56)
and
lim
!1 
@Q
@
=  

m
g

(2  1)

lim
!1 
! 2
 
lim
!1 
@!
@

(57)
Now, from (27) and (34) we can conclude that
! = C 
1
2 (; La; !) :

lim
!1 
!

8, since lim
!1 
C (; La; !) = 1 (58)
After some computations, we can additionally get from Lemma 3 and (34) that
lim
!1 
@C
@
= 1  2 < 0 (59)
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Finally, expressions (58) and (59) imply that
lim
!1 
@!
@
=

lim
!1 
! 2

:
(2   1)
2 > 0 (60)
If we now go backwards, plugging (60) into (57) and then (57) into (56), our nal result after
rearranging is that lim!1 
@f
@ =
La
(1 )

(Ls La) : lim!1 

(mg )(2 1)!1 2
(1+Q)22

> 0: This positive sign
means, by (55), that dLad < 0: And hence, from (20),
dg
d > 0: Since
dRca
d
=
@Rca
@!c
@!c
@
+

@Rca
@!c
@!c
@La
+
@Rca
@La

:
dLa
d
(61)
we must obtain now the expressions for @Rca@!c and
@Rca
@La
to clarify unambiguously which is the sign
of (61). Then, from (33) and (54),
@Rca
@!c
=

1 +
am (1  caLa)
(Ls   La)

:
1
(1 + caam!c)
2 (62)
@Rca
@La
=
am (1  caLa)
(Ls   La)2
:
!c
(1 + caam!c)
(63)
If we consider simultaneously (61) and (62), we can easily observe that
lim
!1 
dRca
d
> lim
!1 
dLa
d

@Rca
@!c
@!c
@La
+
@Rca
@La

which means that lim!1  dRcad > 0 if
dh
dLa
< lim!1 

@f
@La

: Finally, if we focus on the evolution
of !c, its total derivative can be proved to be positive provided that  > 1=2 and dhdLa <

@f
@La

;
since
d!c
d
=
@f
@
:
24 dh@La
@h
@La
  @f@La

35 (64)
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. Since Ln and Ls are invariant in our model, from Lemma 1 we can infer that dRnsd < 0 i¤
d
d < 0:
The easiest way to compute dd is by considering expressions (31) and (33). Let
D(Lc; Ln) =

Ln + a

g
m+ g

(65)
From (20), (25), (33) and (72),  = wn
h
Ln + a
h
  1(2 1)

Lc
am
  Lna
ii
; and by taking logs and
di¤erentiating
lim
!1 
d
d
1

=
 am
 
dLa
d

am 2 (Ln   ag)   lim!1 
h
dQ
d + (2   1)Q
i
(1 +Q)
+
dD
d
1
D
(66)
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It is easy to show that, precisely,
dD
d
1
D
=
am
 
dLa
d

am 2 (Ln   ag) (67)
and therefore, by (57), (60), (66) and (67),
lim
!1 
d
d
1

=   lim
!1 
h
@Q
@La
dLa
d +
(2 1)Q
2
i
(1 +Q)
< 0 (68)
Apart from the assumptions of this proposition, expressions (46) and (68) ensure that lim!1 
d
d <
0:
6.4 Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Let nk =
nk
nn
and ck =
ck
nc
be the proportion of northern and southern equity, respectively,
owned by a representative household living in location k, where nk and ck are the absolute
measures of northern and southern rms owned by that household. Then, the amount of gross
savings for any household living in k can be expressed as follows:
(Gross Savings)k = GSk = wk + ckncc + nknnn   Ek (69)
We know that in our steady state
_jk
jk
=
_jk
jk
  g = 0; i.e. _jkjk = g 8j = north, core; 8k= north, core,
periphery. Therefore,
_nk
nk
=
GSkfnk
vnnk
 m =
_ck
ck
=
GSk (1  fnk)
vcck
= g (70)
where fnk is the proportion of total gross savings devoted to the purchase of northern equity. Then,
from (70),(3) and (24), we can easily solve for GSk:
GSk = (m+ g)nka

g
m+ g

wn + gckamwc (71)
On the other hand, it is easy to see from (3) and (21) that the instantaneous variation in the value
of previously-owned assets, considering also the e¤ect of imitation, is the following:
@Vk
@t
=   (m+ g) nka

g
m+ g

wn   gckamwc
where Vk is the value of previously-owned assets by a household in location k. Since, by (71) and
the last equation; (Net Savings)k=GSk+
@Vk
@t =0 8t in any steady state, any households wealth is
kept constant along the balanced growth path, i.e.
yk = Ek = wk + 

ckamwc + nka

g
m+ g

wn

(72)
where yk is household ks income, 8k= north, core, periphery in steady state.
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6.5 Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. From (29) we can check that
lim
!1 
 > 1=2 i¤ (1  ) < lim
!1 

wn

Ln + a

g
m+ g

  wc (Lc + am)

(73)
As we can conclude after inspecting expressions (20), (25), (31) and (32), condition lim!1   > 1=2
can only be satised i¤ (73) holds. Now we just have to look for a su¢ cient condition that guarantees
(73). From our denition of Q in expression (30), condition (73) can be restated as follows:
(1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i
  (1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i :  (Lc + am)
Ln   ag
2 1
< P2 (74)
By the assumptions established in this lemma, necessarily P2 > 0: Lets now dene the function
H(Lc; Ln) =
(1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i
  (1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i :  (Lc + am)
Ln   ag
2 1
  P2 (75)
It is easy to see that @H@Lc  0 and @H@Ln  0 8Lc; Ln: Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for (73) follows
from any situation in which H(Lc; Ln) < 0: We want to search for a relation between the initial
values of Lc and Ln that ensures that H(Ls; Ln) < 0 and hence that lim!1   > 1=2 . For any
initial value of Lc that satises (20) and (26), we can determine that, from (75),
H(Lc;
aLc
am
) =  P2 < 0 and H(Lc; a

Lc
am
  
1  

) > 0 (76)
Since the equality H(Lc; Ln) = 0 contains an implicit function Ln(Lc) for which @Ln@Ls =  
@Q=@Ls
@Q=@Ln
> 0
8Lc; Ln; then L^n (Lc) is an increasing function in Lc: Since H(Ls; Ln) is a monotone and continuous
function in Ln; from (76) we can apply Bolzanos theorem to state that
9 a unique function Ln(Lc) such that H(Lc; L^n(Lc)) = 0 8Lc (77)
Finally, from the sign of the partial derivatives above, we can say with certainty that 8Lc; if Ln >
L^n(Lc) then H(Lc; Ln) < 0; which means that Q < P and hence that lim!1   > 1=2:
6.6 Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. From (11) we can express the wide-gap assumption when  ! 1  as
Ln   (1 )Lcam + 

 (Lc + am)
:
24 (1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i
  (1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i
35  2 (78)
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Rearranging and rewriting (78) with an equality, we get the following quadratic equation in Lc :
Lc
am
  Ln
a

=

(1 )
1 +
(Ln a (1 )am +a)

2 
1  (Lc+am)
 (79)
Since, from condition (26), Lc > 0 and Ln > aamLc  
a
(1 ) ; we can conclude that the denominator
of the right-hand side of (79) is bigger than 1. This means that at least one root Lc1of (79) satises
for sure the inequality amLna < L

c1 < am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
; because the right-hand side is positive
and smaller than 1  : Now we have to make sure that L

c1is a unique root within the interval
(amLna ; am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
):
If we formally restate (78) we can obtain the following inequality:
Z(Lc) = EL
2
c + FLc +G  0 (80)
where
E =
am
2 
1    a(1  )
a2m
(81)
F =
Ln

2 
1    
2 
1  am
a

+ 
h
a+ 
1
1  am

2  11 
i
am
G =  

Ln
a
h


a+ 
1
1  am

+ Ln
i
+ 
3 2
1  :
1
1  am
2

We can see that, in principle, the signs of E and F are undetermined but that of G is clearly negative,
which implies that Z(0) < 0. Lets explore now the implications of the 2 possibilities concerning the
sign of A:
-If E >0 then, since Z(0) < 0, Z(Lc) is necessarily a quadratic function with one positive and
one negative root. Therefore, we know for sure that there is a unique Lc1 such that Z(L

c1) = 0
and amLna < L

c1 < am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
: Given that this curve cuts the horizontal axis from below,
conditions (80) and (26) will be satised.
-If E < 0, Z(Lc) will be now a concave function with at least one positive root Lc1, but in principle
it could have another one within our particular interval
h
am
Ln
a ; am
h
Ln
a +

1 
ii
: In order to reject
this latter possibility, it will be enough to show that Z(amLna ) < 0 and Z(am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
) > 0;which
would imply that the other root is out of our interval.
It is possible to check that
Z

am
Ln
a

=   (2  1)
2+2
22+1 :am:

Ln
a
+ 

< 0
Z(am

Ln
a
+

1  

) =
2  1
2

Ln
 22 + 2  2 > 0
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Again, since this curve intersects the horizontal axis from below, if E < 0 the wide-gap case is
compatible with positive measures of manufactures in both countries i¤ amLna < Lc  Lc <
am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
:
To summarize, if  ! 1  , 8am and a, 8 2 (0; 1) ;9 a unique Lc such that both (11) and (26)
hold i¤ amLna < Lc  Lc < am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
; where Lc is the smallest positive root of equation (79).
7 Legend
7.1 Endogenous variables.
Aks : Amount of the homogeneous (primary) good consumed by a reprsentative individual from
location k at time s (k =north, core, periphery).
nk(s) : Measure of northern rms owned by a representative household from location k at time
s (k =north, core, periphery).
ck(s) : Measure of southern rms owned by a representative household from location k at time
s (k =north, core, periphery).
c = nnc : Inverse of the proportion of the aggregate measure of manufactures produced in the
core.
C(; Lc; !) :Measure of the home-market advantage of the north to o¤er higher aggregate demand
to rms located there.
D(Lc; Ln) = Ln + a

g
m+g

Eks : Total expenditure allocated to consumption by a representative individual from location k
at time s (k =north, core, periphery).
c : Steady-state proportion of southern manufactures (c =
1
c =
nc
n in steady state).
fnk : Fraction of savings devoted to buying new norther rms (start-ups) by a household from
location k:
g = _nn =
_nc
nc
: Steady-state innovation growth-rate.
GSk : Amount of gross savings of any household living in location k (k =north, core, periphery).
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Lc : Aggregate measure of population currently living in the core.
La : Aggregate measure of population currently living in the periphery.
m = _ncnn : Rate of imitation of northern varieties by southern researchers.
nk : Total measure of manufactures currently produced in location k (k =north, core, periphery).
n : Total aggregate measure of manufactures existing currently in the global economy.
pj (s) : Market price of variety j at time s:
pa (s) : Market price of the homogeneous (primary) good at time s:
pk(s) : Market price of any variety produced in location k at time s (k =north, core).
k : Current operating prots for any manufacturing rm in location k (k =north, core).
Q = mg !
1 " : Measure of the imitation potential of the core to copy northern patents (attracting
world demand to southern varieties).
Rca : Relative per-capita income in the core with respect to the periphery.
Rns : Relative per-capita income in the north with respect to the south.
Us(X
k
s ; A
k
s) : Value of the felicity functionat time s for a representative consumer from location
k:
Vk : Aggregate value of the assets owned by a representative household from location k:
vk : Value of the patent of any variety produced in location k:
wc : Nominal wage of any worker living in the core, employed either in manufacturing or research.
wn : Nominal wage of any worker living in the north, employed either in manufacturing or
research.
wa : Nominal wage of any worker living in the periphery, employed in primary production.
W kt : Discounted ow of lifetime utility obtained from period t onwards by a representative
household/individual in location k (k =north, core, periphery).
! = wcwn : Relative wage of the core with respect to the north.
!c =
wc
wa
: Relative wage of the core with respect to the periphery.
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Xks : Subutility function (aggregator) derived from the consumption of manufactures at period s
by a reprsentative individual from location k (k =north, core, periphery).
xj(s) : Individual demand for variety j at time s.
xn : Aggregate demand for any northern manufacture (variety).
xc : Aggregate demand for any variety produced in the core.
yk : Income of any household from location k (k =north, core, periphery).
 : Proportion of aggregate consumption spent by Northerners.
7.2 Parameters and exogenous variables.
am : Indicator of research costs of imitation in the core.
a : Indicator of research costs of innovation in the north.
 : Positive measure of substitutability among varieties of manufactures.
 = 1 " : Measure of international trade-openness.
E : Aggregate expenditure in the global economy (taken as numeraire).
 = 11  : Elasticity of substitution among varieties of manufactures.
Ls : Aggregate measure of population living in the south.
Ln : Aggregate measure of population living in the north.
 : Positive measure of international-trade costs (classical iceberg-notion).
 : Relative weight assigned to manufactures in the felicity function.
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